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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court
invoked the Second Amendment to invalidate a law that forbade
almost all citizens from possessing a handgun or other operable
firearm. Since that decision was announced, the lower courts have
resolved a large number of Second Amendment challenges to less
restrictive gun control laws. This Article reviews and evaluates the
principal debates that have arisen in the federal courts, focusing
primarily on a sharply divided panel decision from the D.C. Circuit
and a majority opinion from the Seventh Circuit. The three opinions
considered in this Article articulate the most important extant
alternative interpretations of the Supreme Court’s Heller opinion.
The Article concludes that the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit
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is superior to either of the approaches offered in the D.C. Circuit
case.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S HELLER DECISION
For a long time, gun rights advocates have hoped that the Supreme
Court would begin reviewing gun control laws under the standard of
“strict scrutiny,” which requires the government to demonstrate that
its regulations are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.1 Gun control advocates would prefer “rational
basis” review, which requires the government only to articulate some
legitimate purpose that the legislature could conceivably have sought
to serve with its regulations.2
In District of Columbia v. Heller,3 the seminal case involving a
general ban on the possession of any handgun or other operable
firearm, the United States urged the Court to adopt a standard of
“intermediate scrutiny.” Relying primarily on a First Amendment
free speech case upholding a ban on write-in voting, the federal
government urged the Court to remand the case with instructions to
balance the degree of the burden on constitutionally protected
conduct against the strength of the government’s regulatory interests.4
When the Solicitor General pressed this point at oral argument, Chief
Justice Roberts expressed his skepticism:
Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are
proposed, “compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly
tailored,” none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder
why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard.
Isn’t it enough to determine the scope of the existing right that the
amendment refers to, look at the various regulations that were
available at the time, including you can’t take the gun to the

1. See, e.g., Brief for the Nat'l Rifle Ass'n & the NRA Civil Rights Def. Fund as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (No. 07-290).
2. Before the Heller decision, advocates of gun control had long maintained that
the Second Amendment protects no right to arms outside the context of militia
service. See, e.g., Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
(No. 07-290). Absent such protection, gun control laws would be subject to rational
basis review under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, as virtually all
laws are.
3. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4. Brief for the United States at 8, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290) [hereinafter
Brief].
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marketplace and all that, and determine how these—how this
restriction and the scope of this right looks in relation to those?
I’m not sure why we have to articulate some very intricate standard.
I mean, these standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind
of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First
Amendment picked up. But I don’t know why when we are starting
afresh, we would try to articulate a whole standard that would apply
in every case?5

When the Court issued its opinion in Heller, Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion rather pointedly declined “to articulate some very
intricate standard.”6 But neither did the Court adopt the approach
that Chief Justice Roberts suggested at oral argument.
Notwithstanding the opinion’s extended examination of the historical
record before and after the ratification of the Second Amendment, it
did not “determine the scope of the existing right that the amendment
refers to.”7 The Chief Justice clearly was referring to the scope of the
right to bear arms as it was understood in 1791, and the Court’s
opinion does pay lip service to that standard.8 But this was not the
basis for the decision.
Instead, Heller rejected the handgun ban because it constituted a
prohibition on an entire class of arms that is overwhelmingly chosen
for self-defense by American society today.9 The Court then
removed any doubt about its rejection of Chief Justice Roberts’s
suggestion by endorsing a wide range of gun control regulations that
had no analogues in 1791:
• Bans on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill.10
• Bans on carrying firearms “in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings.”11
• Laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.12

5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290)
[hereinafter Transcript].
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to
have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even
future judges think that scope too broad.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35.
9. Id. at 628-29.
10. Id. at 626.
11. Id.
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• Bans on carrying concealed weapons.13
• Bans on “those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns” and
apparently machineguns.14

Had the Court simply evaluated the D.C. handgun ban by
comparing it with the various regulations that existed in 1791, it might
have been a very easy case. Nothing remotely resembling a ban on
handguns existed at that time, before that time, or long after that
time. But the same could be said about almost all of the modern
forms of gun control, for there were very few restrictions on the
private possession of arms during the founding era. The common law
did prohibit private citizens from terrifying the public by going armed
in public with dangerous and unusual weapons.15 And a few
jurisdictions had adopted safety regulations involving the storage of
highly flammable gunpowder or the irresponsible discharge of
weapons.16 But that’s about it.17
The problem with the approach that the Chief Justice suggested at
oral argument is that the paucity of gun control regulations in the
framing era does not necessarily imply that the Second Amendment
was meant to proscribe all regulations except those resembling laws
that had already been adopted. The Amendment might have been
meant to prevent the federal government from overriding or
supplementing state decisions about gun control, but it is highly
implausible that it was meant to permanently forbid Congress from
imposing regulations in the District of Columbia and the territories

12. Id. at 626-27.
13. Id. at 626.
14. Id. at 625. The first three dicta in this list, and possibly the last two, might be
read as establishing only a presumption of constitutionality. If so, the Heller opinion
makes the presumption look very close to conclusive. See Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356
n.32 (2009).
15. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 148-49
(1769). For a discussion of American authorities acknowledging, and in some cases
qualifying, this common law rule, see Lund, supra note 14, at 1362-64.
16. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 631-34.
17. There were, of course, also laws that required citizens to arm themselves in
connection with their militia duties. See id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These
laws imply nothing about the scope of the government’s authority to forbid citizens to
arm themselves as they choose in everyday life. There were also laws restricting the
possession and use of weapons by politically disfavored segments of the population,
such as slaves. Id. at 614-15 (majority opinion). Such precedents have little or no
bearing on modern forms of gun control.
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that went beyond what the states had chosen to impose on their own
citizens before 1791.18
At that time, American citizens had an almost unlimited right to
arms by virtue of the fact that legislatures had chosen to impose
almost no regulations on them. But such inaction did not debar
legislatures from altering their citizens’ legal rights in the future.
What Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia call, respectively, the
“existing” or “pre-existing” right constitutionalized by the Second
Amendment19 would therefore have to be understood as protecting
whatever individual freedom legislatures were obliged to respect. But
we have virtually no historical evidence about the scope of that
limitation on government because it had not become a matter of
public controversy.
Faced with the impossibility of actually adopting the historical
approach that the Chief Justice suggested at oral argument, the Court
nonetheless was unwilling to adopt what he called “an allencompassing standard” like strict or intermediate scrutiny.20 Heller
did expressly reject the rational basis test,21 and it held that a ban on
the possession of handguns in the home was unconstitutional.22 As
noted above, the opinion also endorsed several forms of gun control
in dicta, but without offering any clear indication of why the Court
regarded these regulations as constitutionally permissible.23 Beyond
that, the Court provided little guidance, and virtually no clear
guidance.
Heller might have been regarded as an exercise in judicial restraint
if it had simply invalidated the D.C. law on the ground that it severely
compromised what the Court called “the core lawful purpose of self—
defense.”24 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s approval of various
regulations not at issue in the case, combined with his lackadaisical
reasoning in support of several legal conclusions, created a mist of
uncertainty and ambiguity.25

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Lund, supra note 14, at 1353-55, 1368-69.
See Transcript, supra note 5, at 44; Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
Transcript, supra note 5, at 44.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
Id. at 628 n.27, 628-29, 635.
Id. at 635. For a detailed discussion, see Lund, supra note 14, at 1356-67.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
For more detail, see Lund, supra note 14, at 1349-67.
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After McDonald v. City of Chicago26 applied the Second
Amendment to the states, the need for a workable framework of
analysis became more acute because state and local gun control laws
are more numerous and often more restrictive than nationally
applicable regulations.27 Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the federal
courts of appeals have quickly and fairly uniformly begun to coalesce
around an interpretation of Heller that provides such a framework.
The emerging consensus can be roughly summarized as follows:
• Some regulations, primarily those that are “longstanding,” are
presumed not to infringe the right protected by the Second
Amendment.28
• Regulations that severely restrict the core right of self-defense
are subject to strict scrutiny.29
• Regulations that do not severely restrict this core right are
subject to intermediate scrutiny.30

26. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
27. McDonald reviewed a handgun ban that was nearly identical to the one at
issue in Heller. The McDonald plurality opinion concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes the Second Amendment applicable to the
states in the same way that it applies to the federal government under Heller,
whatever that may be. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment but relied instead on the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at 3058-59
(Thomas, J., concurring). He left open the possibility that the Fourteenth
Amendment right to arms might have a somewhat different scope than the Second
Amendment, but made no definitive statement on that issue. Id. at 3059-63. For a
detailed discussion, see Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (Or Are There
More?) in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487 (2011).
28. Many of these cases involve regulations that are at least arguably
comprehended within the Heller dicta summarized above. See, e.g., United States v.
Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding “long-standing prohibition”
against shipping and receiving firearms through interstate commerce while being a
user of a controlled substance); United States v. Hatfield, 376 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th
Cir. 2010) (upholding statute prohibiting the possession of an unregistered shortbarreled shotgun); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding
“longstanding” statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by unlawful drug users);
United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875-76 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a
parking lot at a post office is a “sensitive place” from which guns may be banned);
United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding statute
prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon on an aircraft).
Many judges, including both the majority and dissent in the D.C. Circuit’s Heller II
case (discussed infra) have assumed that the Supreme Court approved virtually all
longstanding regulations. This is incorrect. Heller approved certain longstanding
regulations but said nothing about others. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying
text.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding
strict scrutiny inapplicable because “[t]he burden imposed by the law [at issue] does
not severely limit the possession of firearms”).
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This framework is closely analogous to what Chief Justice Roberts
called “standards that apply in the First Amendment[, which] just
kind of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First
Amendment picked up.”31 The Heller Court seems to have selfconsciously refrained from adopting such a framework, but neither
did it specify any alternative.
The lower courts have not enjoyed the luxury of confining their
rulings to anomalous laws aimed at disarming the civilian population,
which Heller said would be invalid “[u]nder any of the standards of
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”32
Faced with harder cases, and with the fogginess of the Heller opinion,
these courts understandably have reached for a framework
resembling the familiar “baggage” picked up by the First
Amendment. And Heller did hint at such an approach through its
repeated references and analogies to the First Amendment and to
First Amendment case law.33
We might therefore expect Second Amendment jurisprudence to
continue developing through the application of this model. Maybe it
will. But in a recent dissenting opinion, Judge Brett Kavanaugh of
the D.C. Circuit advanced a vigorous challenge to the model, claiming
that Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller dictates a very
different framework. It is therefore worth considering the differences
between Judge Kavanaugh’s approach and the one adopted by his
colleagues and by other courts of appeals.
I conclude that the analytical framework in the majority opinion is
superior to the framework that Judge Kavanaugh advocated. The
majority, however, misapplied that framework. A variation applied
by the Seventh Circuit illustrates how the lower federal courts can
best approach novel Second Amendment issues.
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’ S HELLER II DECISION
Prior to 2008, the District of Columbia had sought through its laws
to bring about an almost complete disarmament of the civilian

30. See, e.g., United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he
courts of appeals have generally applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold Congress’s
effort under [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g) to ban firearm possession by certain classes of nonlaw-abiding, non-responsible persons who fall outside the Second Amendment’s core
protections.”).
31. Transcript, supra note 5, at 44.
32. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008).
33. See id. at 582, 595, 635.

LUND_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1624

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

2/6/2013 10:47 PM

[Vol. XXXIX

population. The Heller plaintiffs attacked only what they saw as the
most vulnerable regulation, namely the ban on possessing a handgun
or any other operable firearm in the home. After losing the case, the
D.C. government went back to the drawing board in an effort to
restrict civilian access to guns as much as possible in light of Heller.
In Heller II, the named plaintiff in that case, along with other
individuals, challenged several provisions of the city’s revised gun
control laws.34
The plaintiffs in Heller II challenged three main elements of the
D.C. gun control regime:35
• A requirement that gun owners register each of their firearms
with the government. The registrant is required to submit detailed
information about himself and the weapon, and to renew the
registration every three years. Citizens are forbidden to register
more than one pistol in any 30-day period.36
• Every applicant for registration must in effect be licensed to
register by passing a series of tests, attending a training course, and
being fingerprinted and photographed.37
• D.C. also prohibited a wide range of semi-automatic firearms, as
well as any magazine with a capacity of more than 10 rounds.38

A. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, the court
provided the following analysis and conclusions.39
The basic registration requirement, as applied to handguns but not
long guns, is similar to longstanding regulations that are
presumptively constitutional, and the plaintiffs failed to overcome
this presumption by showing that the requirement has more than a de
minimis effect on their constitutional rights.40
Some of the specific registration provisions are novel rather than
longstanding, and therefore are subject to additional scrutiny. The
court reached the same conclusion about the licensing requirements

34.
2011).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1247 (D.C. Cir.

See id. at 1248-49.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1248-49.
Id. at 1249.
See id. at 1253-64.
Id. at 1253-54.
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and about all of the registration and licensing requirements for long
guns.41
Relying largely on First Amendment free speech decisions, the
court concluded that none of these requirements imposes “a
substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense,” and that strict
scrutiny is therefore inappropriate.42 Instead, the court concluded
that intermediate scrutiny should be applied, which requires the
government to show that the regulations are “substantially related to
an important governmental objective.”43 Finding that the record was
insufficient to apply this standard of scrutiny, the court remanded for
further proceedings.44
The court declined to decide whether semi-automatic rifles and
large capacity magazines receive any protection at all under the
Second Amendment.45 The Supreme Court’s Heller decision had
created a special rule under which the Second Amendment does not
protect those weapons that are not “in common use at the [present]
time” for lawful purposes.46 The Heller II majority concluded that

41. See id. at 1255-56.
42. Id. at 1257 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994)).
43. Id. at 1257-58 (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
44. Id. at 1258, 1260.
45. The court also refused to consider issues involving semi-automatic pistols and
shotguns, on the ground that none of the plaintiffs had tried to register such weapons.
46. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624, 627 (2008). This might be
understood as a corollary of the Court’s presumption that many long-standing
regulations are constitutional. It was presented, however, as an interpretation of
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). As it happens, Heller’s interpretation of
Miller is utter nonsense. Justice Scalia misstated the facts of the case, and interpreted
its holding to mean the opposite of what it said. For a detailed analysis, see Nelson
Lund, Heller and Second Amendment Precedent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335
(2009).
The slip opinion in Heller said that Miller had “upheld . . . convictions” under a
federal statute. District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 49 (June 26,
2008). That is indisputably false, for there were no convictions in the case and the
Miller Court clearly noted this fact. The preliminary print of the U.S. Reports
attempts to correct the error by changing the word “convictions” to “an indictment.”
Heller, 554 U.S. at 621. The new statement is also false. Miller reviewed the
dismissal of an indictment, and remanded the case for the district court to reconsider
its validity in light of the appropriate legal test. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 183. The
Miller opinion made it clear that it was quite possible that the proper application of
this test might result in the district court again dismissing the indictment. See Miller,
307 U.S. at 178. The indictment was therefore not “upheld.” (The Heller dissenters
made the same mistake as the majority in the slip opinion and have included the
same failed attempt at a correction in the preliminary print.) Compare District of
Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 26, 2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/07-
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semi-automatic rifles are commonly owned, but was unsure whether
they are in common use for either of the lawful purposes specifically
mentioned in Heller, namely hunting and self-defense.47
Assuming arguendo that such weapons are protected by the
Second Amendment, the court then concluded that it was
“reasonably certain” that the prohibition does not substantially
burden the right.48 Accordingly, it applied intermediate rather than
strict scrutiny.
The court upheld the ban on certain semi-automatic rifles,
primarily because of evidence suggesting that they are nearly as
dangerous or prone to criminal misuse as the fully automatic rifles
that Heller had excluded from constitutional protection.49 The court
also upheld the ban on high-capacity magazines on the basis of
testimony that they are useful to criminals and that they encourage an
excessive number of shots to be fired by those engaged in legitimate
self-defense.50
B.

The Kavanaugh Dissent

Judge Kavanaugh thought that the majority’s approach to the case
was based on a complete misinterpretation of Heller. In his view, the
Supreme Court has rejected the tiers-of-scrutiny approach. Instead,
he believes Heller teaches that courts are to assess gun regulations by
looking to the Constitution’s text and to history and tradition, and by
drawing analogies from these sources when dealing with modern
weapons and new circumstances.51 Judge Kavanaugh analyzed the
new case as follows.52

290.pdf, with Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. It remains to be seen whether the final version
of the U.S. Reports will reflect yet another effort to describe the facts in Miller
accurately. Even if it does, it cannot change the fact that nobody on the Heller Court
seems to have actually read the very short Miller opinion, or the fact that Heller read
Miller’s holding to mean the opposite of what it says.
47. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261. Contrary to the court’s assumption, Heller did not
say or imply that these are the only lawful purposes relevant to the constitutional
analysis.
48. Id. at 1262.
49. Id. at 1262-63.
50. Id. at 1263-64.
51. To highlight the importance of the difference between his approach and the
majority’s, Judge Kavanaugh cited Justice Scalia’s concurrence in McDonald, which
argued that text, history, and tradition are less subjective and more susceptible to
reasoned analysis than the interest-balancing approach that Judge Kavanaugh
believes is exemplified in tests like strict and intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1274
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He argued first that D.C.’s entire registration and licensing scheme
is unconstitutional because it does not meet Heller’s test approving of
“longstanding” regulations.53
He conceded that registration
requirements imposed on gun sellers meet Heller’s test, but pointed
out that there is no tradition of imposing such requirements on gun
owners.54 The city’s licensing requirements, which are inseparable
from the registration requirement, are similarly novel and therefore
also invalid.
Judge Kavanaugh’s analysis of this issue resulted from a misreading
of Heller. The Supreme Court said that certain longstanding
regulations are at least presumptively constitutional, and Judge
Kavanaugh is right that registration requirements imposed on gun
owners are not longstanding. But Heller did not say that novel
regulations are always unconstitutional. It is possible that the relative
novelty of the handgun ban at issue in Heller may have affected the
attitude of some Justices, but the Court actually rested its decision on
a perception that many Americans today have good reasons for
making handguns their preferred weapon for defense of the home.
The Court did not say that the novelty of the ban ipso facto rendered
it unconstitutional, or that a longstanding ban on handguns would
necessarily have been upheld.
Judge Kavanaugh also concluded that D.C.’s ban on certain semiautomatic rifles is unconstitutional because (1) they are not
meaningfully different from semi-automatic handguns, which Heller
had already decided may not be banned,55 and (2) they have not
traditionally been banned and are in common use today.56
This reading of Heller is also technically flawed. The case involved
a revolver, not a semi-automatic.57 Heller did not say one way or the

(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
52. Id. at 1269-96.
53. Id. at 1291.
54. Id. at 1292.
55. Id. at 1286.
56. Id. at 1286-88.
57. Dick Heller, the only plaintiff whose constitutional challenge the Supreme
Court considered, was found to have standing because his application for a license to
possess a specific single-action .22 caliber revolver was rejected by the D.C.
government. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 375–78 (D.C. Cir.
2007). A copy of the application, which identified the particular gun at issue, was
filed in the trial court as Exhibit A accompanying the plaintiffs’ brief in support of
summary judgment, and thus was part of the record in the case. Plaintiffs’ Brief in
Support of Summary Judgment at Exhibit A, Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F.
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other whether a ban on semi-automatic pistols would be
unconstitutional.
Judge Kavanaugh also misread Heller’s statement that “the Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed
by law—abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short—barreled
shotguns.”58 The awkward double negative in this sentence strongly
indicates that the Court was careful to avoid saying that all weapons
typically possessed for lawful purposes are protected. Whatever the
Court may decide in the future, it has not yet said that all weapons in
common use for lawful purposes are ipso facto protected by the
Second Amendment.
III. APPLYING HELLER
A. The Rights and Wrongs of the Majority Approach in

Heller II
Judges Ginsburg and Kavanaugh engaged in a detailed debate
about the appropriate framework for analysis. Neither judge made a
plausible case that his preferred framework can be derived from the
Heller opinion. Their debate is fairly elaborate, and I will just give a
couple of illustrative examples.
Judge Kavanaugh argued that Justice Breyer’s dissent in Heller
advocated the use of intermediate scrutiny, and that the majority’s
express rejection of Breyer’s approach implies a rejection of that
standard of review.59 Judge Ginsburg correctly responded that Heller
rejected only Breyer’s arguably idiosyncratic version of intermediate
scrutiny rather than a more exacting version suggested by the
Supreme Court’s actual case law.60
Judge Ginsburg, for his part, drew his approach largely from postHeller decisions of other circuit courts, not from Heller itself. As
Judge Kavanaugh appropriately noted, the Heller opinion nowhere
endorses the use of strict or intermediate scrutiny.61 He was also right
Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 03-0213 EGS). Whether or not any of the Justices
examined the record, the Court had to be referring to this specific revolver when it
said: “Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of Second
Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun and must
issue him a license to carry it in the home.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 635 (2008) (emphasis added).
58. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
59. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1276-82 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1264-65 (majority opinion).
61. See, e.g., id. at 1273 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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to point out that Judge Ginsburg ignored or discounted numerous
passages in Heller that rely on history and tradition, and condemn the
use of interest-balancing tests.62 The application of tests like strict
and intermediate scrutiny necessarily entails a balancing of the
government’s interest against those of the aggrieved citizen, and
Heller certainly does denounce interest-balancing, at least when there
is a better alternative available.
The real problem is that Heller is so muddled that the kind of
methodological debate found in Heller II cannot be resolved. That
said, Judge Ginsburg’s approach seems to me to be clearly preferable.
First, as I explained above, Judge Kavanaugh’s approach required
him to misread Heller in order to find guidance precise or clear
enough to provide rules of decision in Heller II. Second, and perhaps
more important, Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion itself shows that his
use of history and tradition is little more than a disguised version of
the kind of interest balancing that he purported to condemn. At
crucial points, he simply issued ipse dixits unsupported by any
historical evidence, and at other points, he misrepresented historical
facts.63 He could hardly have avoided doing so, given the paucity of
relevant historical evidence about the original meaning of the Second
Amendment. That problem becomes more acute in cases dealing
with less restrictive regulations than those at issue in Heller. Covert
interest-balancing dressed up as an analysis of history and tradition is
no better than more straightforward interest-balancing in the form of
strict or intermediate scrutiny, and almost certainly worse.
This is not to say that Heller II was correctly decided. Judge
Kavanaugh’s most powerful arguments are directed against the
majority’s application of its framework to the challenged regulations.
Those regulations were manifestly meant to suppress the legitimate
exercise of constitutional rights, and the majority was far too
deferential to the government in reviewing them.
Judge Kavanaugh is right that D.C.’s registration and licensing
scheme is quite different from the limited registration requirements
that have been widely imposed for many decades. The important
point, however, is not their novelty, but their lack of an adequate
justification. Whether under strict or intermediate scrutiny, they
should not be upheld without a showing by the government, at an

62. See, e.g., id. at 1275-82.
63. For a detailed proof of these claims, see Lund, supra note 14, at 1356-67.
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absolute minimum, that they can make a significant contribution to
public safety.
The government tried to do so by arguing that a registration system
enables police officers who are executing warrants to determine
whether residents in the dwelling have guns.64 This rationale is
woefully inadequate. The greenest rookie officer in D.C. would know
that many residents possess unregistered guns.65 The regulation
therefore cannot accomplish the purpose advanced to justify it, and
the justification cannot satisfy any form of heightened scrutiny.
Apart from the government’s failure to show a substantial relation
between public safety and its registration and licensing requirements,
such requirements have traditionally been resisted in America for a
reason closely bound up with an important purpose of the Second
Amendment.66 When the government collects this kind of detailed
information about individuals and the guns they own, it gives itself a
powerful tool that it could use for the unconstitutional confiscation of
guns or the unconstitutional harassment of gun owners.67 Even a
narrow reading of the Second Amendment would have to
acknowledge that its purpose includes the prevention of such
illegalities. For that reason, D.C. should have an especially heavy
burden to bear in justifying regulations that would help it to do what
it has already demonstrated that it wants to do, namely disarm the
civilian population. The government came nowhere close to meeting
that burden.68

64. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1294-95 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
65. One would think that anyone who lives or works anywhere near D.C. would
know this. Why the court failed to take judicial notice of this notorious fact is
something of a mystery.
66. For a useful discussion of the long and unsuccessful effort to impose national
registration requirements on gun owners, see David Kopel’s contribution to this
th
symposium. David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War of the 20 Century—and
Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527 (2012).
67. This is not a paranoid fantasy. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, “Only Law

Enforcement Will Be Allowed to Have Guns”: Hurricane Katrina and the New
Orleans Firearm Confiscations, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 339 (2008) (discussing
the aftermath of a police decision that only law enforcement officers would be
allowed to possess guns in New Orleans during the breakdown of civil order after
Hurricane Katrina).
68. To its credit, the majority recognized that the government had failed to meet
its burden with respect to some of the registration and licensing requirements. In
calling for further development of the record on remand, however, the court merely
required the government “to present some meaningful evidence” to justify its
predictions about public safety. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1259. That does not sound like
much of a hurdle.
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The majority’s decision to uphold D.C.’s ban on a wide range of
semi-automatic rifles is also inconsistent with heightened scrutiny.
The banned rifles are defined primarily in terms of cosmetic features,
and they are functionally indistinguishable from other semi-automatic
rifles that are not banned.69 The regulation therefore is arbitrary and
lacks any real relation to public safety. It certainly fails the majority’s
own test, under which “the Government has the burden of showing
there is a substantial relationship or reasonable ‘fit’ between, on the
one hand, the prohibition . . . and, on the other, [the Government’s]
important interests in protecting police officers and controlling
crime.”70 That failure alone should have sufficed to invalidate the
ban.71
Heller assumed that fully automatic rifles are outside the
protection of the Second Amendment.72 The Heller II majority
analogized semi-automatic rifles to these unprotected weapons on the
ground that semi-automatics can fire almost as rapidly as those that
are fully automatic.73 This argument is fallacious. Heller treated fully
automatic weapons as a special case, apparently on the basis of
history and tradition, without saying anything at all to suggest some
kind of penumbral rule that protected weapons must have a
significantly slower rate of fire than those that are fully automatic.74
Even assuming, arguendo, that such a penumbral rule could be
inferred from Heller, D.C. allows other semi-automatic rifles that can
The underfire just as quickly as those that are banned.75
inclusiveness of the regulation confirms it was not based on a
functional similarity between automatic and semi-automatic
weapons.76 The putative similarity therefore cannot justify the
regulation under any level of heightened scrutiny.
69. See id. at 1285, 1296 n.10 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1262 (majority opinion).
71. See id. at 1290-91 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
72. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008) (asserting that it
would be “startling” to conclude that restrictions on machineguns might be
unconstitutional).
73. See 670 F.3d at 1263.
74. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-25.
75. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1285 n.10, 1290 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
76. Judge Kavanaugh also says that the majority “contends that semi-automatic
handguns are good enough to meet people’s needs for self-defense and that they
shouldn’t need semi-automatic rifles.” Id. at 1289. He rightly rejects this kind of
argument, as Heller itself had already done. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). I
could not find this contention in the majority opinion, so perhaps it was removed
after Judge Kavanaugh circulated his dissent to the other members of the panel. Or
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The majority offered two justifications for the ban on largecapacity magazines. First, it accepted testimony that such magazines
give an advantage to “mass shooters.”77 Maybe they do. But how
could the District’s regulation possibly reduce this problem? Large
capacity magazines are freely available by mail order and at stores in
nearby Virginia. The government apparently assumed that criminals
bent on mass shootings will refrain from obtaining such magazines
out of respect for D.C.’s regulation. Rather than accept this farfetched assumption, the court might well have taken judicial notice of
the opposite. Or at least required the government to prove such a
counterintuitive notion.
The majority also credited testimony that large-capacity magazines
can tempt legitimate self-defense shooters to fire more rounds than
necessary.78 This testimony shows at most that banning such
magazines could conceivably have some good effects on some
occasions. But the same could be said about D.C.’s original and
unconstitutional ban on all handguns, which illustrates why the
argument is fatally flawed. Banning medical books containing photos
of half-dissected cadavers might save some children from
psychological trauma, which would be a good thing, too. But nobody
would consider such a book ban constitutional.
Assuming that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, the
government is required at a minimum to show a substantial relation
between the regulation and public safety. The Heller II majority
cited no evidence showing that the magazine ban would save any
significant number of lives, or any lives at all. Nor did it even
consider the possibility that innocent civilians might lose their lives
because they ran out of ammunition while trying to defend
themselves. The government failed to meet its burden of showing
that the magazine ban satisfies even intermediate scrutiny, and the
ban should therefore not have been upheld.
B. A Better Approach: Ezell v. City of Chicago
Chicago responded to McDonald in much the same fashion as D.C.
had responded to Heller: by adopting a sweeping and burdensome
new regulatory regime to replace the handgun ban that the Supreme
perhaps he detected such a contention in the majority’s statement that D.C. does not
“prevent a person from keeping a suitable and commonly used weapon for protection
in the home or for hunting.” Id. at 1262 (majority opinion).
77. Id. at 1263.
78. Id. at 1263-64.
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Court had invalidated. In Ezell v. City of Chicago,79 the Seventh
Circuit reviewed Chicago’s decision to require one hour of range
training as a prerequisite to lawful gun ownership, while
simultaneously banning from the city any range at which this training
could take place.80
Judge Diane Sykes began by offering a more detailed and
somewhat different interpretation of Heller and McDonald than that
of the D.C. Circuit.81 Briefly stated, she interpreted the Supreme
Court’s opinions as follows.
First, just as some categories of speech are unprotected by the First
Amendment as a matter of history and tradition, some activities
involving arms are categorically unprotected by the Constitution.82
To identify those categories, courts should look to the original public
meaning of the right to arms—as of 1791 with respect to the Second
Amendment and as of 1868 with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment.83
Second, if an activity is within a protected category, courts should
evaluate the regulatory means chosen by the government and the
public benefits at which the regulation aims. “Borrowing from the
Court’s First Amendment doctrine, the rigor of this judicial review
will depend on how close the law comes to the core of the Second

79. 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).
80. Id. at 689-90.
81. See id. at 700-04. After the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with orders to
grant the motion. Because of the procedural posture of the case, the court of appeals
did not issue a decision on the merits. In explaining why the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits, however, the court
provided a detailed analysis that I will treat for simplicity of exposition as though it
were a merits decision.
82. Id. at 702.
83. Id. at 702-03. The anchor for this conclusion in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence is weak, especially because the only example of such categorically
unprotected activities clearly identified in Heller was the possession of short-barreled
shotguns (and apparently also machineguns). That example was based on the Court’s
interpretation of a 1939 precedent, which had not concluded that such weapons were
outside the scope of the right to arms in 1791. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 624-25 (2008). Nonetheless, Judge Sykes’s interpretation of Heller does
have the merit of making some sense out of Heller’s rhetoric about original meaning,
which is probably about the most that an inferior federal court can be expected to
accomplish.
Judge Sykes’s distinction between the original meaning of the Second Amendment
itself and its meaning as understood in 1868 also makes considerable sense, though
there is no apparent support in Heller or McDonald for her use of the distinction
here.
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Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”84
Broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second Amendment
right—like those at issue in Heller and McDonald—are categorically
unconstitutional.85 All other laws must be judged by one of the
standards of means-end scrutiny used in evaluating other enumerated
constitutional rights, and the government always has the burden of
justifying its regulations.
The court concluded that firing ranges are not categorically outside
the protection of the Second Amendment.86 Historical evidence
approvingly cited in Heller (albeit not on this issue) supported the
conclusion,87 and a variety of other evidence cited by the City fell “far
short of establishing that target practice is wholly outside the Second
Amendment as it was understood when incorporated as a limitation
on the States.”88
The more difficult question for the court involved which standard
of review to apply. Judge Sykes plausibly interpreted Heller to
permit the use of First Amendment analogies, and she summarized
the rather intricate set of tests generated by the Supreme Court in
that area.89 From those cases, she distilled an approach to the Second
Amendment.90 Severe burdens on the core right to self-defense will
require an extremely strong public-interest goal and a close meansends fit.91 As a restriction gets farther away from this core, it may be
more easily justified, depending on the relative severity of the burden
and its proximity to the core of the right.92
Applying this test to the gun-range ban, the court concluded that
the right to maintain proficiency in the use of weapons is an
important corollary to the meaningful exercise of the core right.93
This requires a rigorous review of the government’s justifications, “if
84. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703. Here again, Judge Sykes adopted a questionable
interpretation of Heller, which did not say or imply that First Amendment analogies
are so generally applicable. Still, her interpretation of Heller is not foreclosed by
Justice Scalia’s opinion, and it has the merit of making sense.
85. Judge Sykes said that the Supreme Court opinions “suggest” this conclusion.
Id. She is right that the suggestion is there, and I believe that she is also right that no
better interpretation is apparent.
86. Id. at 706.
87. See id. at 704.
88. Id. at 706.
89. Id. at 708.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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not quite ‘strict scrutiny.’”94 The City did not come close to satisfying
this standard.95 It produced no evidence establishing that firing
ranges necessarily pose any significant threat to public safety,96 and at
least one of its arguments was so transparently a makeweight that
“[t]o raise it at all suggests pretext.”97
The analytical framework that Judge Sykes adopted in this case is
broadly similar to the one that the Heller II majority adopted. Her
approach, however, is superior in at least two important respects.
First, Heller II adopted a view reflecting a somewhat loose
consensus of other circuit courts. Judge Sykes, however, relied
almost entirely on Heller, McDonald, and other Supreme Court
decisions, and she exhibited a detailed and thoughtful familiarity with
the Court’s opinions. It is true that Heller and McDonald can be read
differently, as Judge Kavanaugh showed in Heller II, but Judge
Sykes’s analysis has better support in the text of the opinions.
Inferior federal courts are required to follow the Supreme Court, but
they are not required to follow other circuits.98 It is therefore
generally a better practice to focus on what the Supreme Court itself
has said—to look, so to speak, for the Court’s “original meaning”—
than to play a kind of telephone game by interpreting Supreme Court
opinions on the assumption that other courts have read them
correctly.
Second, and of greater significance, Judge Sykes took the
importance of the Second Amendment far more seriously than the
Heller II majority did.
Whereas Heller II casually applied
intermediate scrutiny in a way that too often accepted flimsy or even
fatuous justifications for the regulations, Judge Sykes insisted on the
kind of rigor that courts routinely demand in First Amendment cases.
Unlike the Heller II majority, she gave appropriate attention to the
fundamental principle, expressly adopted in McDonald, that the
Second Amendment should not “be singled out for special—and

94. Id.
95. Id. at 709. One member of the panel favored a less stringent standard of
review, and would have given more credit to the City’s public-safety concerns. See id.
at 713-15 (Rovner, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 709 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 710.
98. State courts may have more latitude than federal courts in dealing with
guidance from the Supreme Court. See Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis and Originalism:
Judicial Disengagement from the Supreme Court’s Errors, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1029, 1039–41 (2012).
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specially unfavorable—treatment.”99 If enough other judges follow
her lead, perhaps the Second Amendment will not return to its preHeller status as a kind of constitutional pariah.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s Heller opinion disapproved a governmental
ban on keeping a handgun in the home, while endorsing a number of
other gun control regulations. The Court refused to adopt any clear
analytical framework for resolving the countless issues about which
Heller said nothing. Some of its reasoning, or rhetoric, suggests that
such issues should be resolved solely by consulting American history
and tradition, along with the text of the Constitution. Other parts of
the opinion can be read to suggest that courts should develop a
framework more akin to what Chief Justice Roberts called the
“baggage” that the First Amendment has picked up from the
judiciary.100
The federal courts of appeals have declined to follow the historyand-tradition approach. Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s effort to take that
approach in his Heller II dissent illustrates why this approach is not
likely to prove fruitful, or even workable. Other circuit courts have
tried to adapt the First Amendment “baggage” to this new area, with
mixed results. The D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion in Heller II
illustrates the perils of adapting this body of case law without
attending with sufficient care to the Supreme Court’s existing Second
Amendment jurisprudence and without adequate regard for the value
of Second Amendment rights. Judge Diane Sykes’s opinion for the
Seventh Circuit in Ezell shows that circuit judges who are so inclined
can show appropriate respect both to the Supreme Court and to the
Second Amendment. Judge Sykes deserves to be emulated by other
judges who take their office seriously.

99. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3043 (2010); cf. United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 651–54 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Judge Frank Easterbrook’s majority opinion for relieving the government
of its burden of justifying its disarmament regulation and for depriving a criminal
defendant of an opportunity to contest the dubious non-record evidence on which the
majority relied).
100. Transcript, supra note 5, at 44.

